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INTRODUCTION 
“Energy is the lifeblood of our society”. This is the opening phrase of the “Energy 
2020, a strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy” as put forward by the 
European Commission in 2010 and re-iterated by the former Energy Commissioner 
Gunther Oettinger in speeches and articles (Oettinger, 2010, 2013). Energy is not just 
a commodity like others. For a very long time, it has been the basis of development 
for our societies. "Coal and afterward oil have been the pillars of the industrial 
revolution" (Vinois, 2017. 27) and have ameliorated the standards of living of the 
western world. Energy has also been a source of geopolitical conflicts and now has 
become the center of the current debate about climate change (Vinois, 2017). Thus it 
comes as no surprise that the EU has made energy one of its top priorities. Energy has 
been at the heart of the European integration process as can be seen by the 1951 
Treaty that established the European Coal and Steel Community and the 1957 
European Atomic Energy Treaty.  
Despite the significance of energy resources, a common energy policy does not have a 
long history. During the 1980's and 1990's, the aim of the Commission’s energy 
policy was to liberalize the gas and electricity sectors and to integrate the energy 
market. The liberalization agenda was underpinned by broader ideological trends 
(Kuzemko & Hadfield, 2016). The end of the Cold War demonstrated the failure of 
the centrally planned economic system and showed the dominance of neo-liberalism 
as the optimal economic system. Furthermore, abundant oil and gas supplies and low 
prices led to the idea that adequate supplies would be the result of market forces. The 
focus of the European Commission (hereafter the Commission) was to improve 
competitiveness by building, integrating and regulating markets (Helm, 2005). The 
external dimension of energy policy was focused on promoting the internal market 
rules, regulations and values and trying to build markets beyond its borders via 
multilateral and bilateral agreements with producing and transit states (Youngs, 
2007). The theoretical model underpinning this approach is the model of external 
governance. The approach of external governance can be defined as “the expansion of 
EU rules beyond EU borders” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, pg 807).  
In the beginning of the 20
th
 century, a change was observed in the goals of energy 
policy. Security of supply became a priority of the E.U's energy policy agenda, along 
with growing concerns about climate change (Helm, 2005). The security of supply 
concern was exacerbated by two disputes in 2006 and 2009 between the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine (Kuzemko & Hadfield, 2016). The result was in 2006 the 
realization of the need for a common energy policy. This was spelled out by the 2006 
Green Paper and the 2007 and 2008 Strategic Energy Reviews which put forward the 
E.U energy policy objectives and proposed the means to achieve them. As far as the 
external energy relations are concerned, the E.U’s effort to promote its internal market 
rules and regulations was met with varying degrees of success with producing 
countries.  Russia demonstrated that it is not willing to accept the E.U rules on how to 
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organize the energy industries and markets, as shown by its decision to withdraw from 
the Energy Charter Treaty in 2009 (Kustova, 2016).  
In the beginning of 2014, the goals set out in the 2007 and 2008 Strategic Reviews 
were not considered successful. The geopolitical crisis between Ukraine and Russia 
and the annexation of the Crimea, along with instability in the Middle East due to the 
Arab Spring, raised new concerns about the security of supply. At the end of 2014, the 
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk proposed the creation of an Energy Union, to 
“end the Russia’s stranglehold” (Tusk, 2014). In February 2015 the Commission put 
forward the proposal for the Energy Union, which had five interrelated dimensions. 
The proposal's first dimension puts emphasis on security solidarity and trust among 
members and along with that emphasis on the external dimension of the E.U’s energy 
relations.  
Academics argue that the E.U Energy Union proposal marks a paradigm shift in the 
energy policy, from a market approach to a more (geo)political approach to energy 
policy (Goldthau & Boersma, 2017; Youngs, 2015). Thus the aim of this thesis is 
twofold. First of all to assess if there is indeed a paradigm shift towards a more 
geopolitical approach in the Energy Union Package and secondly taking Russia, the 
E.U’s most important energy supplier as a case study, assess if the potential change in 
the E.U’s approach to its external energy relations has been effective in mitigating the 
challenges presented by the E.U’s dependency on Russia. The research question is: 
can a paradigm shift from markets approach to a geopolitical approach be observed at 
the Energy Union proposals and the subsequent documents and if yes, how has this 
affected the E.U’s approach to Russia? To answer these questions, the conceptual tool 
of policy paradigms shift will be employed. More specifically, through document 
analysis, it will be researched if there is a change in four dimensions: ideas informing 
policies, policy objectives and policy instruments and policy institutions along with 
the economic and geopolitical factors shaping the energy policy of the E.U.  The 
importance of the topic lies first of all in the importance of energy as indicated above. 
Moreover, the thesis raises questions about the E.U's actorness in international affairs. 
The topic becomes increasingly relevant in today's world where many argue that the 
end of the post-Cold War liberal order is near. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The beginning of 2000's witnessed a revival of energy-related issues on the research 
agenda of International Relations and European Studies. Factors that contributed to 
this trend were  first of all the shift in geography of energy demand, the ever growing 
resource nationalism that started casting doubts about the neo-liberal agenda of the 
1990's and the increased politicization of the European Union-Russia energy relations, 
mainly due to the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009 (Kustova, 2015). As far as 
European energy policy is concerned, the academic debates have mainly focused on 
the integration of the E.U's internal market. The literature on the external energy 
relations of the E.U is relatively limited in comparison to the literature on the E.U-
Russian relations and the energy policy from a market integration perspective. 
Nevertheless, there are quite a few academics who have dealt with the issue of E.U 
external energy relations from various perspectives. One of the first and most 
prominent studies of the E.U energy policy and energy security is by Correlje and 
Van der Linde (2006). They discuss the security of energy supply to the E.U, by 
presenting the challenges to the position of the E.U due to economic and geopolitical 
developments and arguing about the necessity of integrating energy policy to trade, 
security and foreign policy. Yergin (2006) also warns about the economic and 
geopolitical challenges to the security of energy supply in the 21st century and 
proposes ways to deal with the energy insecurity.  
One strand of academic literature has dealt with the legal aspects of the external 
energy policy of the E.U. It aims to clarify the competences among the E.U 
institutions and member states as far as energy policy is concerned according to the 
E.U energy law and treaties (Haghighi, 2007). Others have dealt with what the Lisbon 
Treaty that entered into force in 2009 meant for external energy policy, concluding 
that it did not have a significant impact on the external energy relations (Van Vooren 
2012; Leal-Arcas et al, 2014; Braun, 2011). Another strand of academic literature in 
the field is trying to shed light on the factors that prevent member states to agree on 
and implement a common energy policy and to “speak with one voice” to third 
supplying/consuming countries (Youngs, 2007; Van der Linde, 2007; Baumann et 
Simmerl , 2011; Aalto et Korkmaz Temel, 2014). These studies attribute the inability 
of the E.U’s member states to form a common external policy to various factors such 
as variety of interests and the incomplete internal market.  
A common theme when external relations are studied is the E.U’s efforts to 
institutionalize energy trade and tie other countries with legally binding agreements 
according to its own model. One of these initiatives is the Energy Charter Treaty. 
Academics have not only covered its legal aspects, (Leal-Arcas et al, 2014) but also 
its policy implications and they have tried to explain why efforts for multilateralism 
have not been as successful as the E.U hoped. (Kustova, 2016; Belyi 2014; Herranz-
Surrallés, 2016). The second initiative for multilateralism by the E.U is the Energy 
Community. The Energy Community is an International Organization established in 
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2005 between the E.U and the countries of South East Europe and the Black Sea, 
aiming at “extending the EU internal energy market to South East Europe and beyond 
on the basis of a legally binding framework” (Energy Community, 2017).  Academics 
have tried to shed light on the incentives that make third countries accept E.U’s export 
of market rules, values and norms (Renner 2009; Padget 2009, 2011; Prange-Gstöhl, 
2009; Abbasov 2014). Others employ specific case studies to demonstrate the degree 
to which the external aspect of the E.U energy policy is successful. Examples include 
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the emerging economies of Brazil, India, and 
China. (Weber 2014; Chaban & Knodt 2015, Stoddard 2016; Collins & Bekenova 
2016). While these studies are very helpful on shedding light on the various aspects of 
the E.U external policy, they do not adequately address the fact that the E.U wants to 
promote its energy interests in the areas examined and it is not just a benevolent actor, 
promoting market rules and values. In other words, they do not challenge the common 
view of the E.U as a normative actor and they do not stress enough the self-interest of 
the E.U when it wants to promote its policies beyond its borders. 
 
As far as the paradigm shift is concerned, Helm (2005) acknowledges that there is a 
paradigm shift in energy objectives from competitiveness to security and climate 
change mitigation since the beginning of the 21
st
 century. Kuzemko (2014) stresses 
the fact that geopolitical ideas have entered the E.U policy discourse, while Methais 
(2013) recognizes that the existing policy does not work and calls for a more 
geopolitical approach by the EU. An important contribution is made by Herranz-
Surrallez, who discusses the extent to which the E.U has started assuming role of 
energy diplomacy. Energy diplomacy can be defined as the various forms of state 
power used to secure access to foreign energy supplies, and to promote government-
to-government co-operation in the energy sector (Goldthau 2010 .25). The problem is 
that while she recognizes that there has been a shift to geopolitics, she is not clear 
about her answer. Youngs & Far (2015. 27) indicate that the Energy Union document 
might demonstrate a “subtle shift” but they base it to interviews with E.U officials and 
not so much on the document itself. Goldthau and Boersma (2017) argue that there 
are elements of paradigm shift in the Energy Union proposals to a more geopolitical 
approach but it depends on how these will be implemented. They do not, however, 
provide enough justifications for it and they do not employ any specific paradigm 
change measurement, thus their view is quite ambiguous.
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THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical model that will be employed, as mentioned above is the model of 
external governance. The most common view when it comes to the E.U’s actorness in 
its external relations  is the one put forward by Manners (2002) who views the E.U as 
a normative power. In 2004, Lavenex gave a more complete picture of the external 
relations of the E.U, introducing the concept of external governance. "This approach 
focuses attention on the importance of the institutional setting for the kind of policy 
outcomes produced and highlights the continuity between internal and external 
developments in EU policy-making…It allows us to look at the ‘wider Europe' 
agenda as the continuation of an internal process of institutionalization, underlines the 
legacy of previous rules and procedures developed towards accession countries, and 
explains rule expansion as an attempt to manage the external interdependence of the 
EU as a nascent political system" (Lavenex, 2004. 685). This concept is particularly 
relevant for the external energy relations because the formal approach to the external 
dimension of E.U energy policy is to promote its internal market regulations and 
create a common regulatory space with countries beyond its borders. Another 
interrelated concept with external governance is the “regulatory state” put forward by 
mainly Goldthau and Sitter. The E.U can be defined as a regulatory state because it 
uses competition policy and regulation as policy instruments and its mission is market 
integration. “Internally, this has led the EU to form a single market for goods and 
services, the world’s largest. Externally, it has given rise to a liberal grand strategy 
that seeks to address global problems by way of establishing binding multilateral rules 
and institutions (Goldthau & Boersma, 2017. 101). In other words, the EU in order to 
influence the behavior of third countries does not use military power but the policy 
instruments available are competition laws and regulations (Goldthau & Boersma, 
2017, Goldthau & Sitter 2014, 2015; Andersen et al, 2016).  
In this thesis the conceptual tool of policy paradigm shifts will be employed to answer 
the overarching question of this thesis. The question to be answered is if there is a 
paradigm shift in the external energy policy of the E.U from a market-based approach 
to a more geopolitical. The famous work on policy paradigms by Peter Hall (1993) 
draws upon the constructivist variants of new institutionalism (Kern et al, 2014) to 
demonstrate the role that ideas play in policy change. In this thesis, the model of 
paradigm change put forward by Kern et al (2014) will be employed because it is 
more suitable to demonstrate the energy policy changes by the EU. They maintain that 
a policy paradigm occurs at four levels or consists of four dimensions. "1) Ideas about 
the subject and how it should be governed (interpretive framework); 2) policy goals; 
3) policy instruments and 4) governance institutions" (Kern et al, 2014. 515). If there 
are significant differences at all four levels in a time period, in this case from 2006 to 
2017, then a policy paradigm shift can be claimed. They also contend that crises play 
an important role in paradigm change. The role of crisis is significant in this thesis 
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because the proposal for the creation of the Energy Union was largely attributed to the 
geopolitical crisis between Russia and Ukraine.  
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
As stated above the main question that this thesis will attempt to answer is whether or 
not a paradigm shift can be observed with the proposal for the Energy Union and the 
subsequent documents. Thus, the method of empirical analysis apart from secondary 
literature will be document analysis. European Union documents which spell out the 
energy strategy of the E.U will be assessed. The year 2006 is the chosen chronological 
starting point of the analysis. This year is chosen because it represents the year that a 
union-wide energy policy was formed and presented. It is maintained that in order to 
demonstrate whether or not there is a policy paradigm shift in the external dimension 
of energy relation of the E.U, it is appropriate to compare the documents between 
2006 and 2017.  The criteria for the selection of documents were various. First of all, 
documents were chosen that depict a union-wide strategy. Moreover, they describe a 
common view of what the E.U desires to achieve with its energy policy and what are 
the instruments to achieve it. More importantly, all of the analyzed documents have a 
specific section of external relations. Documents such as the Gas Regulation of 2010 
which do not contain the external dimension will not be analyzed. In the analysis, 
specific questions will be asked in tandem with the criteria of paradigm shift outlined 
above. More specifically, what are the ideas pertaining the documents? What are the 
policy objectives? What are the policy instruments and the institutions to carry out the 
policies? Furthermore, due to the fact that the secondary question of this thesis is 
about energy relations with Russia, the context in which relations with Russia are 
mentioned will be examined and assessed. 
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 ANALYSIS 
The significance of energy cannot be disputed. The implementation of the Energy 
Union Proposals is one of the 10 priorities of the European Commission under the 
presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker (European Commission, priorities, n.d). In this 
chapter, the development of internal as well as external energy policy will be 
analyzed. The analysis will be divided into three parts corresponding to three different 
chronological periods according to the documents adopted regarding energy policy. 
The chapter will begin with a short introduction to the beginning of the energy policy 
and the state of affairs in the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's before the beginning of a 
Common European energy policy. The second part corresponds to the documents 
published between 2006 and 2008 and the third refers to the period between 2008 and 
2014. The last part examines the Communication for the Energy Union and the 
subsequent documents outlining the state of the Energy Union and the Diplomacy 
Action Plan date from 2015 to the time of writing, June 2017. Every part will be 
examined as follows. First, we will look at the economic and political factors and 
challenges that informed the adopted energy policies by the E.U. After that, in order 
to assess the E.U's response to the challenges, we will examine the documents putting 
forward the E.U energy policy. After examining the E.U policy discourse, we will see 
if and how this discourse is translated into practice. 
 
 As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, energy has been at the heart of 
European integration. In the 1950's two treaties were signed that were relevant to the 
management of energy resources. In 1951 the treaty for the establishment of the 
European Community for Steel and Coal was signed, followed by the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957. Europe was left 
devastated after the experience of the Second World War. The prevalent idea among 
the founders of the European Integration was first of all to reject power politics and 
nationalism that has destroyed Europe, (Kuzemko & Hadfield, 2016) and secondly, by 
transferring the national powers over steel and coal production to a supranational 
commission, the European governments wanted to promote cooperation between 
states and manage the competition about the energy supply sources, mainly coal and 
nuclear (McGowan, 2008). ). The Commission has made several attempts to foster a 
Common European Energy Policy but these efforts did not come to fruition. The oil 
shocks of the 1970's demonstrated the differences among member states and the fact 
that energy policy was a matter of national security and member states were not 
willing to share the competences on energy policy making with the E.U. However, 
some progress was made in some technical issues of lower importance which did not 
restrain the national energy policy (McGowan, 2008). During that time, energy policy 
was conducted by the member states and the main objective of their energy policy 
was to secure affordable and adequate supplies of energy resources.  
In the 1980's and 1990's, the material and ideological factors were different than the 
ones in the 1970's. The oil and gas supplies were abundant and the prices were very 
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low. In the ideological domain, the end of Cold War showed the failure of the 
centrally planned economies, and neo-liberalism became the prevalent economic 
system, that all countries should implement and follow (Van der Linde, 2007; 
Kuzemko & Hadfield, 2016).  Due to the abundance of energy supplies and the 
broader ideological trends of economic liberalism, at that time it was perceived by the 
Commission that secure energy supplies would be the result of an integrated and 
liberalized market. Thus the focus of the Commission's energy policy, in line also 
with the liberal market ideas, became to liberalize and integrate the gas and electricity 
sectors. The result was the first two liberalization packages of 1996/98 and 2003 that 
aimed to liberalize the gas and electricity sectors. The last was in 2009. Energy 
integration at that time can be characterized as a negative integration which was to 
reduce trade barriers, instead of positive integration which forming a common energy 
policy (Baumann & Simmerl, 2011). 
 
Market liberal ideas of the E.U's internal energy policy have also informed the 
construction of its external energy relations. The traditional approach to external 
energy policy was projecting the internal policy of liberalizing the energy market 
beyond the E.U's borders. This approach took two forms. The first one corresponds to 
the theoretical model of external governance, analyzed above. In short, the E.U wants 
to export its norms, values and market rules beyond its borders. In the case of energy 
policy, the aim is to make its neighbors and the not so immediate neighbors to have 
the same market organization and to foster the same market principle of liberalization 
and to be binded by the same regulatory framework. This is achieved mainly by 
bilateral or regional agreements with producer, consumer or transit countries and by 
pushing regulations through multilateralism via international fora (Youngs, 2007). 
The most indicative example of multilateral initiative that started in the 90’s is the 
Energy Charter Treaty. The Energy Charter started initially as European Energy 
Charter in 1994 by the Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. Its aim was to export the 
E.U market rules for energy trade beyond its borders also due to the absence of any 
other institution regulating energy trade (McGowan, 2008). The Energy Charter did 
not gain much traction. The lowest point was in 2009 when Russia after failing to 
ratify its provisions, withdrew its membership. It is worth noting that Norway has not 
ratified it either. Efforts to revitalize the Energy Charter started in 2015 in The Hague 
in an effort to make it more inclusive (Kustova, 2016).  
The second expression of internal policy beyond the E.U borders is the so-called 
regulatory state. The E.U’s policy instruments are competition policies and regulation. 
The E.U does not have the hard power means to secure energy supplies, like the USA 
but it relies on regulation and competition. This means that the E.U can influence the 
behavior of third countries’ companies through regulation. If the energy companies of 
third countries wish to sell their products in the large E.U market, they have to 
conform to the E.U’s rules of the game (Goldthau & Sitter, 2014, 2015; Andersen et 
al, 2016; Goldthau & Boersma, 2017). Below we will analyze in detail how the E.U 
regulation and especially the Third Energy Package have affected the relations with 
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Russia. This is the traditional approach of external energy policy. By examining the 
policy discourse from the documents outlining the E.U energy policy between 2006 
and 2017 and the policy practice we will see if the E.U has changed this market-based 
approach to a one with more geo-political elements. 
The role of the Commission was to create a regulatory environment for safe 
investments but the member states were the ones securing their energy supplies. This 
was achieved by the states negotiating long-term take or pay contracts with producing 
countries with the help of monopolistic energy firms or state-backed companies called 
the national champions (Van der Linde, 2007). Long term, take or pay contracts 
shared the costs of production between the producer and consumer and also oil 
indexation. "LTCs oblige importers to buy a minimum quantity of gas per year, at a 
price that’s tied to the oil price, usually lagged by some six months" (Goldthau, 2012. 
213). Part of the Commission’s liberalization policy was to unbundle the energy 
monopolies and do away with long-term contracts.  
CHALLENGES OF THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 
Since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, it became increasingly understood that a 
common energy policy would be needed to face the challenges of the 21
st
 century. 
The challenges at the turn of the century, economic and geopolitical were multiple.  
Firstly, the E.U’s indigenous production was declining and the supply import 
dependence would reach 70% by 2030 (E.C, 2006a). The E.U imported its vast 
majority of gas supplies only from three suppliers, Russia, Norway, and Algeria. 
While the oil market was already an open and diversified market, the market for 
natural gas, remained regional and depended on expensive infrastructure. Producing 
states in the beginning of the century started reviving so-called resource nationalism. 
Resource nationalism can be defined as "moves by governments to assert greater 
sovereignty over what are often the key sources of export and fiscal 
revenue".(McGowan, 2008. 99). Prices also increased dramatically compared to the 
levels of the 1980's and 1990's. Moreover, the emergence of China and India created 
an even stronger competition for energy resources (Correlje & Van der Linde, 2006). 
The E.U saw its ability to shape prices and the energy markets decreasing. 
Furthermore, its ability to project its market rules beyond its borders was not met with 
success considering the refusal of Russia and Norway to ratify the Energy Charter 
Treaty. Additionally, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East with Al Qaeda 
threatening to bomb critical energy infrastructure made matters worse (Yergin, 2006). 
Supply security concerns started ascending to the E.U policy agenda after a gas 
supply disruption in the beginning of 2006 caused by a dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine. The 2006 crisis highlighted the vulnerability of the E.U and the dangers of 
being dependent on a single supplier. The E.U at that time depended on Russia for 
40% of energy supplies (Proedrou, 2007). Moreover, the security energy supplies 
became a politicized issue whereas before it was a technical issue. Energy policy by 
the E.U was concerned with making rules for competition and not security of 
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supplies. Apart from security concerns, climate-change mitigation actions entered the 
debates about energy policy. Helm (2005) argues that a policy paradigm shift can be 
observed as far as the energy policy goals are concerned. He states that the focus of 
the goals of energy policy shifted towards security and environmental concerns in the 
beginning of the century in contrast to market integration and liberalization in the 
1980’s and 1990’s.  
E.U POLICY RESPONSES 
In 2005 the leaders of E.U states, under the presidency of Tony Blair, agreed at 
Hampton Court to discuss energy affairs. The European Council tasked the 
Commission to prepare a document for a common framework on energy policy 
(Vinois, 2017). That was the Green Paper of 2006, "A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy". The overarching objectives of the 
energy policy were clearly stated. The main energy policy objectives were 
sustainable, competitive and secure energy. This document also contained a section 
on international energy policy and expressed the need that the member states speak 
with one voice on external matters. In 2006 a document by the Commission and the 
High Representative that only referred to external energy policy was published and 
two Energy Reviews followed in 2008 and 2009. Below these documents will be 
analyzed according to the policy paradigm shift criteria, ideas, objectives, 
instruments, and institutions. Furthermore, the references to Russia in these 
documents will be assessed. 
 
The documents put forward by the E.U, for a collective E.U energy policy are: the 
2006 Green Paper "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Secure and Competitive 
Energy", the 2006 Paper from Commission/SG/HR for the European Council "An 
External Policy to serve Europe's Interests",  the 2007 Communication from the 
Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament "An Energy 
Policy for Europe" and the 2008 Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, "Second Strategic Energy Review ,an E.U Energy 
Security and Solidarity Action Plan". These documents spell out the objectives, 
priorities, and means to achieve them. Firstly, in terms of ideas, the documents 
published in that period emphasize on cooperation, interdependence and the need to 
form a common external policy. The general idea is articulated in the first sentence of 
the Green Paper of 2006. "The energy challenges facing Europe need a coherent 
external policy to enable Europe to play a more effective international role in tackling 
common problems with energy partners worldwide" (E.C, 2006a). The E.U and the 
world face challenges that can be best overcome with cooperation with international 
partners. The E.U and their partners are interdependent and the cooperation will 
benefit both parts, thus the E.U should strengthen its partnerships and create new. The 
market approach is also very strong. It is mentioned various times that the E.U should 
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expand its market rules beyond its borders and that the external policy is dependent on 
the completion of the internal market. 
 
The overarching objectives of the external energy policy are the same ones that are 
stated in the beginning of each document. These are sustainability, security, and 
competitiveness. Apart from these general objectives, the documents spell out a 
number of key goals for the external energy policy, such as designing multi-lateral 
governance, diversification and energy efficiency and enhancement of relationships 
with energy partners. 
 
Policy instruments include financial means, trade instruments and bilateral 
agreements and energy dialogues. Furthermore, they include the promotion of 
multilateral fora such as the Energy Community and the Energy Charter Treaty. As 
far as the fourth level of analysis is concerned, the governing institutions, it remains 
rather unspecified if the actor would be the Commission, Council, or the High 
Representative. 
 A few further observations can be made. Firstly, the 2006 Paper from Commission 
and High Representative to the European Council has a much more political tone than 
the other three and its style is similar to the Energy Union Proposal. They both 
mention that the E.U needs to act collectively at its external actions because some 
producing states use energy as a political lever and both documents focus on the 
securing energy resources (E.C, 2006b; 2015a). The 2006 Paper does, however, 
mention the extending the European market as a building block of external energy 
policy (E.C, 2006b). Last but not least, all documents re-affirm that the relationship 
with Russia is important and the energy dialogue of 2001 should be continued. It is 
important to note that despite the 2006 crisis and the diversification discourse, the 
approach to Russia is in line with the market approach. The way to minimize supply 
challenges is that Russia adheres to the E.U market principles. The documents state 
that Russia is and will remain an equal energy partner and energy dialogue should be 
intensified to make condition for integration of Russian market to the E.U market and 
the creation of conditions for investments and reciprocal access to markets. Moreover, 
efforts should be intensified to make sure that Russia ratifies the Energy Charter 
Treaty and Transit Protocol (E.C 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008). 
 
In sum, in all our levels of analysis, we can see that the official discourse of the E.U 
external energy policy entails a market approach, despite the above-mentioned 
geopolitical and economic challenges. This is in line with the theoretical model of 
external governance. We see that the objective of energy partnerships is to export the 
E.U’s regulatory framework.  
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POLICY PRACTICE 
We can see that in practice a lot of the stated initiatives stated in the documents 
analyzed above became a reality. Bilateral agreements were signed in 2006 with 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and in 2004 the Caspian and Black Sea Cooperation 
initiatives were launched (Youngs, 2011). The most important initiative of this period, 
which is considered a success of the E.U external energy policy, is the Energy 
Community. The Energy Community Treaty entered into force in July 2006.  “The 
key aim of the organization is to extend the EU internal energy market to South East 
Europe and beyond on the basis of a legally binding framework” (Energy 
Community, 2017). It is the perfect example of the external governance model. These 
countries for a variety of reasons (see for example Prange-Gstohl, 2009) are willing to 
accept and adopt the E.U energy acquis. Armenia, Georgia, Norway and Turkey take 
part as observers. 
CHALLENGES 2008-2014 
In the years that followed the Strategic Energy Review of 2008, some unexpected 
events influenced the energy the decisions taken by the E.U on its internal and 
external energy policy. Firstly, the financial crisis of 2008 had a twofold effect in the 
E.U: the GHG emissions decreased and secondly the support for renewable sources of 
energy "became economically unbearable for many countries" (Vinois, 2017. 39).  
The result was an increase to the retail electricity prices, due to the socialization of the 
supporting schemes of renewable energy. Moreover, coal became cheaper than gas 
due to the fact that Gazprom maintained its high prices (Vinois, 2017). 
 
The second event that influenced the E.U energy policy was the 2009 gas crisis 
between Russia and Ukraine.  On the seventh of January 2009, gas flows to European 
countries through Ukraine were completely cut off and they started again on January 
20 (Pirani et al, 2009). The crisis left citizens of countries like Bulgaria and Slovakia, 
which rely on Russia for gas with major supply shortages in a cold winter. The crisis 
damaged the image of Russia as a reliable supplier highlighted the vulnerability of 
Europe and put once again the diversification of supplies high on the policy agenda.  
Moreover, as far as Russia is concerned, it became increasingly understood that the 
Russian government was not willing to accept the E.U rules for energy trade that the 
E.U was trying to promote, nor it is willing to integrate into the E.U's internal market. 
This was demonstrated by Russia's withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty in 
2009.  Furthermore, according to Bussena and Locatelli (2013), there were fears about 
the Russian security of supply for two more reasons. Firstly, there were fears about 
Gazprom's ability to invest adequately in the development of new gas fields 
considering that the old ones were in decline. Secondly, amendments to the Russian 
legislation about hydrocarbons led to stricter conditions for international investors to 
access Russian resources. The last and most important factor of uncertainty from the 
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E.U side was the fear of Russia gaining market power and being able to "reduce the 
volumes offered in order to push up prices" (Bussena & Locatelli 2013. 184).  

 
E.U Policy responses 
In the context of the changing economic and geopolitical landscape, the E.U put 
forward three documents in 2010, 2011 and beginning of 2014. In 2010 the 
communication “Energy 2020, A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure 
energy”, in 2011 the “Energy Roadmap 2050” was published and in 2014, before the 
Ukrainian crisis the “A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 
2020 to 2030”. In September 2011, a communication from the Commission was 
published, before the 2050 Roadmap that tackled only issues of external energy 
policy, the “On security of energy supply and international cooperation - "The EU 
Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders"  
A thorough study of the four documents put forward by the Commission between 
2010 and early 2014, uncovers interesting information about the external dimension 
of the E.U energy policy. Firstly, it should be noted that the Roadmap to 2050 and the 
20 to 30 Strategy refer only to environmental issues and the energy transition. As far 
as our first level of analysis is concerned, which is the ideas that pertain the 
documents it can be argued that there is a slight change in comparison to the previous 
documents from the period 2006-2009. The documents from the previous period cited 
challenges that have to be overcome with international cooperation both between the 
member states of the E.U but also between the E.U as a whole and its international 
partners. Emphasis was given in international cooperation and interdependence (E.C, 
2006a, 2007, 2008). The discourse here is different. The emphasis in these documents 
is the promotion of the E.U’s interests through partnerships i.e. diversification of 
energy resources (LNG and interconnections between E.U states but also third 
countries) and supply routes and promoting energy efficiency. In these documents, the 
challenges faced are clearly expressed. “New patterns of supply and demand in global 
energy markets and increasing competition for energy resources make it essential for 
the EU to be able to throw its combined market weight effectively in relations with 
key third-country energy partners”, (E.C, 2010a). “The need for international 
solutions obliges us to push our agenda for decarbonisation and energy efficiency 
with our main partners and in international negotiations and frameworks” (E.C, 2010).  
Furthermore, the need for the E.U members to speak with one voice is repeated.  
The objectives of the energy policy and of the external energy policy are the same as 
the ones mentioned in the previous set of documents; sustainability, security, and 
competitiveness. The 2020 strategy sets out as a first priority the "strengthening the 
external dimension of the EU energy market" and the same goes for the 
Communication of 2011. Market approach and regulatory convergence are the key 
policy instruments and at the same time priorities. There are two elements of novelty 
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of great significance in the Commission's communication of 2011 in the proposed 
policy instruments. The first one is the proposal of ex-ante assessment of 
intergovernmental agreements of member states and third countries and legal support 
to negotiating them. This would “require the Member States to submit draft 
intergovernmental agreements with non-EU countries in the field of energy to it 
before they are signed. The Commission would then check whether they are 
compliant with EU law, and the Member States would have to take full account of the 
Commission's opinion” ( European Parliament Think Tank 2017). The second more 
important element is the direct negotiation of infrastructure projects such as the 
Southern Gas Corridor, with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan that will be analyzed 
below. These show that the E.U Commission aims to enhance its role to energy policy 
and secondly, goes beyond its traditional role of promoting market regulation, to a 
more political role. However, it has to be noted that these proposals are part of the 
communication that precedes the Roadmap to 2050 and are not part of an official E.U 
Energy Strategy. As far as the fourth level of analysis, the governing institutions, is 
concerned, these documents mention that the common foreign and security policy 
have to play a role as well. Relations with Russia are still deemed as important and 
should be continued according to the communication about the external energy 
relations of 2011. Also here, despite the 2009 crisis with Ukraine, the official E.U 
discourse is to create a legal basis that will lead to market convergence. So we can 
conclude that there is the introduction of a geopolitical element, as far as the direct 
negotiation with producing states is concerned, but as far as Russia is concerned, the 
continuation of the market approach is observed.  
POLICY PRACTICE 
In the face of the growing challenges of Russia not willing to accept the E.U’s market 
rules and liberalize its gas market and Gazprom gaining market power, the E.U 
implemented its available policy instruments described above, competition laws and 
regulations, in line with our theoretical model, the E.U as a regulatory state. The Third 
Energy Package entered into force in September 2009. TEP is a legislative package 
aiming to open up the electricity and gas sectors of the E.U’s internal market. TEP, 
although intended mainly for the internal market, has important consequences for 
companies beyond the borders of the Single European Market. The Third Energy 
Package and the other energy market liberalization directives affected Gazprom and 
the other third-country companies in a sense that they should comply with the E.U 
rules if they want to sell their products to the E.U market and also it affects their 
business practice in a number of ways. First of all, the Commission tried to dismantle 
the practice of destination clauses, long-term take or pay contracts (analyzed above) 
and gas price pegged to oil prices. These moves forced third-country companies (and 
Gazprom) to adapt and change their business model. Secondly, article 11 of TEP, 
dubbed as “the Gazprom clause”  prevents non-EU companies from making 
acquisitions in the European downstream energy sector in default of conditions of 
reciprocity” ( Franza & Van der Linde 2017. 92). Furthermore, the rules of TEP have 
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forced Gazprom to abandon the South-Stream pipeline project and do not allow the 
full use of the OPAL pipeline (Stern et al, 2015). Moreover, the Commission in 2012 
launched an anti-trust case against Gazprom for unfair business practices (Andersen et 
al, 2016) that was settled five years later, March 2017.  These policy instruments, the 
use of regulation and competition laws in order to influence the behavior of 
companies outside the E.U’s borders remain within the market-based approach of the 
E.U external energy policy.  
Due to the E.U legislation and flat gas demand, Gazprom was faced with difficulties 
in the E.U gas market and was forced to change its export model by adhering to the 
E.U rules about gas re-selling, introduce spot prices and move away from oil 
indexation and take or pay contracts in order to keep its market share. The result was 
Gazprom’s prices becoming competitive and an increase in its exports to Europe in 
2016 (Gazprom Export Statistics, 2017).  
During the same time, the Commission took a step further and moved to practices that 
are beyond the market-based approach. Firstly, it negotiated long-term contracts with 
Russia on behalf of Poland in 2010. Secondly, in line with the diversification efforts 
away from Russia in 2011 it engaged in direct talks with Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan about the Southern Gas Corridor. The idea of the SGC started in 2007. 
Moreover, the E.U provided financial support to the Nabucco pipeline, which 
eventually lost to Trans Adriatic Pipeline. The Commission also exempted Nabucco 
and its successors from the Single Market Rules (Goldthau & Sitter, 2015; Verda, 
2016; Franza & Van der Linde, 2017). We see that these policy measures go beyond 
the Commission’s role in building markets and remedying competition.  
EUROPEAN ENERGY UNION 2014-2017 
In early 2014 the energy policy of the E.U as it was spelled out in the various 
abovementioned energy strategy documents was perceived as a failure for a variety of 
reasons. First of all at the external dimension level, the South Stream saga revealed 
the inability of the E.U to speak with one voice to third countries, as it was the 
demand since the Green Paper of 2006. Moreover, the geopolitical instability in the 
Middle East caused by the Arab Spring caused uncertainty to the E.U's energy supply 
security (Vinois, 2017). In early 2014 the Ukraine crisis started for reasons that had 
no relation with the energy politics but the crisis exacerbated the fears about energy 
security and inflamed the already existing discourse about diversification of gas 
supplies away from Russia. All those facts led to two important documents for the 
energy strategy. The first one was the Energy Security Strategy of 2014, a few months 
after the 2020 to 2030 Strategy that was mentioned earlier. This document does not 
mention the external dimension of energy policy explicitly but only in the context of 
diversifying the energy supplies. The most important document is the Energy Union 
proposal proposed by the former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in late 2014 to 
"end the Russian stranglehold", as he stated in an interview in the Financial Times 
(Tusk, 2014). The official Energy Union proposal document was published in 
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February 2015. The proposal contained five dimensions, with the first one being 
energy security, solidarity, and trust. The external aspect of the Energy Union is 
mentioned under this dimension. In July 2015 the Council adopted the "Diplomacy 
Action Plan" which contained all the actions that should be taken in order to enhance 
the external dimension of energy policy. In November 2015 and February 2017, two 
documents containing the progress made as far as the Energy Union Package was 
concerned were published.  
An analysis of the different documents put forward by the European Union 
Institutions between late 2014 and 2017 reveals interesting information concerning 
the main question that this thesis is trying to answer. First of all, it should be noted, 
that unlike the previous groups of documents which could be analyzed together 
because they contained more or less the same information in all of the four levels of 
our analysis, this is not the case with this group of documents.  
Energy Union Package: (E.C, 2015a) the Energy Union Proposal is clearly very 
different from all the previous documents, it is security driven and the ideas spelled 
out, indicate the urgency to secure energy supplies and diversify away from Russia. 
The policy objectives of the proposal are focused only on security of supply; 
sustainability and competitiveness are largely absent from the document or given a lot 
less emphasis than previously. The policy instruments are the same, strategic 
partnerships and trade policies but the novelty here is that there is no mention of the 
market regulation convergence which was prevalent in all previous documents. 
Furthermore, there is a difference as far as the governing institutions are concerned. 
The Energy Union proposal states "As part of a revitalized European energy and 
climate diplomacy, the EU will use all its foreign policy instruments to establish 
strategic energy partnerships with increasingly important producing and transit 
countries or regions such as Algeria and Turkey; Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan; the 
Middle East; Africa and other potential suppliers" (E.C, 2015. 6). We see here that the 
term diplomacy has entered the vocabulary of the Commission and also the 
imperative to use all the foreign policy instruments to secure diversification of 
supplies. 
 
Diplomacy Action Plan (Council, 2015):  in terms of ideas, the Diplomacy Action 
Plan continues the discourse of urgency of diversification of supply. Unlike the 
Energy Union Package, emphasis is also put on building markets and on enhancing 
the multilateral initiatives. The objectives of energy diplomacy identified in the text 
are the familiar three: security, sustainability, and competitiveness. In terms of policy 
instruments, significance of partnerships new and old is re-iterated. The difference 
compared to the Energy Union Package is that here, the aim of energy partnerships is 
not only diversification of supplies, but also climate goals and promotion of the E.U's 
leadership in energy efficiency. 
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State of the Energy Union 2015 (E.C, 2015b) the State of the Energy Union 2015 has 
the strong geopolitical and security flavor of the Energy Union Package. Emphasis is 
put on the talks with Ukraine and Russia and on the partnerships which aim at 
diversification of supplies.  
State of the Energy Union 2017 (E.C, 2017): the state of the energy union 2017 has a 
more optimistic tone, stating that there are also opportunities apart from challenges. In 
terms of ideas, we observe a return to a market approach and multilateralism. The 
diversification discourse is also strong. A great emphasis is put to the E.U's leadership 
to climate change mitigation; partnerships now aim to promote the E.U's global role 
on environmental issues, especially partnerships with Asia and Africa. It can be 
observed, however, that the political approach is not off the table. This can be 
demonstrated by the proposal for ex-ante assessment of intergovernmental proposals. 

 
PIPELINE POLITICS: WHICH DIRECTION FOR THE E.U ENERGY POLICY? 
Apart from the E.U efforts to diversify energy supply away from Russia by 
developing the Southern Gas Corridor, the word diversification has entered the 
Russian discourse as well but with a difference. Russian strategy aims at diversifying 
away from Ukraine as a transit country. In 2012 Gazprom started constructing the so-
called South Stream which was a rival project to the E.U led project, Nabucco 
pipeline. In the end of 2014, Gazprom was forced to abandon the project because it 
did not comply with the E.U legislation (Stern et al, 2015). Later Gazprom proposed 
the construction of two other pipelines, the Nord Stream 2 and the Turkish Stream. 
The Nord Stream 2 still divides the European member states. Its construction was in 
cooperation with another five European companies from Austria (OMV), Germany 
(Uniper and Wintershall), the Netherlands (Shell), and France ( ENGIE) (Nord 
Stream 2, 2017). The Nord Stream 2 project like the previous Nord Stream 1 and 
South Stream depicts the divisions between the member states and the inability to 
speak with a common voice vis-a-vis Russia. The countries of Western Europe 
generally support the project, especially Germany. The countries in the East are afraid 
that it will consolidate the Russian monopoly and they are opposed to it. Moreover, if 
built, they will lose the transit fees (Aoun, 2016: Fisher, 2016). This fact demonstrates 
that the E.U has not yet managed to speak with a common voice.  
The position of the E.U is somewhat more complex. The state of the Energy Union of 
2015 states that the project should comply with the relevant E.U legislation and that it 
does not comply with the objectives of the Energy Union of diversification of gas 
supplies (E.C, 2015b).  On June 9
th
 the Commission asked the member states for a 
mandate to negotiate with Russia the operation of Nord Stream 2 (Euractive, 2017).  
This move shows that despite the fact that “the E.U does not like the project 
politically”, as stated by one of the Commission’s spokespersons earlier this year, 
(E.C audiovisual services, 2017; euobserver, 2017), they probably do not have the 
power to stop the project on legal grounds. Secondly, it demonstrates that pipeline 
 20 
 
diplomacy is here to stay. The market approach to the external energy relations will 
be complimented with other more political approaches to producing countries. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we tried to answer the question of whether or not the Energy Union 
Proposals of 2015 mark a policy paradigm shift to the approach of external energy 
policy in the E.U from a market based to a more geo(political) one and secondly if 
and how this shift has affected the E.U’s energy relations with its most important 
supplier, the Russian Federation. To answer the question, the method of document 
analysis was employed. The documents were analyzed by focusing on the policy 
ideas, objectives, instruments and governing institutions according to the conceptual 
tool of policy paradigm shift put forward by Kern et al (2014). Along with the 
documents, the geopolitical and economic factors informing the energy policies were 
also assessed along with the actual policy practice. Moreover, the role that Russia 
plays in each set of documents was examined.  
The analysis of the energy strategy of the E.U as put forward by the various 
documents in the period from 2006 until 2017 combined with the policy practice 
makes us draw important conclusions. Traditionally, the approach of the E.U to the 
external energy policy was to try to export its market rules to and regulatory 
framework by establishing bilateral and multilateral agreements with producing and 
transit countries. The theoretical model of external governance put forward by 
Lavenex (2004) of the E.U underpins this approach. The model of external 
governance states that the E.U is trying to export its rules, norms, and values beyond 
its borders. In the energy sector this is achieved by multilateral and bilateral 
agreements, partnerships and dialogues with energy producing, consuming and transit 
states. However, this approach is successful with transit states, as shown by the 
success of the Energy Community, but not with producing states, which are not 
willing to accept the EU’s rules. The E.U in face of the challenges stemming from 
Russia’s refusal to follow the E.U’s market rules and the fears of Gazprom gaining 
market power responded in two ways. The first way of responding was using the 
policy instruments available at its disposal, regulation and competition laws. By using 
the internal regulation, the Third Energy Package, the E.U managed to force Gazprom 
to alter its export model and adhere to the E.U’s rules. This response remains within 
the limits of the market approach. It is in line with the notion of the E.U as a 
regulatory state which is the second theoretical model of this thesis. The second 
response from the E.U does mark a policy paradigm shift.  
In terms of discourse, in all four levels of analysis, ideas, objectives, instruments and 
governing institutions, it can be observed that the market approach is prevalent with 
the exception of the 2011 Communication (E.C, 2011). The proposal for the Energy 
Union Package represents a paradigm shift from a market-based approach to the 
external relations to a more geopolitical one. The documents spelling out the E.U 
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energy strategy up until the Energy Union document stressed the importance of 
exporting the E.U's regulatory framework beyond its borders via bilateral and 
multilateral agreements. The proposal for the Energy Union stresses out the need for 
international partnership so as to achieve energy diversification. There is almost no 
mention of market principles. The policy paradigm shift is not permanent. In 
subsequent documents such as the Diplomacy Action Plan of 2015 (Council, 2015) 
and the State of the Union 2017 (E.C 2017), the market approach makes a comeback. 
In those two documents, we can observe the co-existence of the market and 
geopolitical approach. This can be explained by the fact that due to interconnections 
and the LNG terminals, the security of supply does not constitute anymore the main 
concern of the E.U energy policy. Also, it is important that Gazprom started changing 
its export model. Thus, the priority of the E.U external energy policy now lies in 
promoting the E.U’s image as a global leader in climate change mitigation and not so 
much in security of supplies.  
In terms of policy practice, the E.U demonstrated elements of paradigm shift by 
providing support for the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline projects and directly 
negotiating with producing countries. In this case, the Commission went beyond its 
traditional role of building markets to a more geopolitical one. This is reinforced by 
the fact that the Commission asked for a mandate to negotiate with Russia the Nord 
Stream 2 project.  
As far as relations with Russia are concerned, it can be argued that the paradigm shift 
towards a geopolitical approach did not affect the energy relations with Russia. The 
decisive factor was the use of regulation and competition that forced Russia to comply 
with the E.U rules. It remains to be seen what effect the negotiations of the 
Commission with Russia will have, if the member states agree to give the mandate to 
the Commission.   
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